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Abstract
This paper estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model for the Japanese economy over 1970:Q1 through 1998:Q4, which
is prior to the period of zero interest rate bound. More specifically, the
New-Keynesian DSGE model with several frictions such as stickiness in
price and wage, habit formation and adjustment cost in investment, de-
veloped by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE, 2005), is estimated
using Bayesian inference via Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simu-
lation. The parameters and impulse response functions of nine shocks
such as monetary policy shock and productivity shock are estimated to be
quite consistent with those in the previous studies such as Onatski and
Williams (2004) and Levin et al. (2005) for the U.S. and Smets and Wouters
(2003) for the euro area. For example, the Japanese monetary authorities
are found to have reacted very actively toward inflation. The only excep-
tion is investment, whose adjustment cost is estimated huge and whose
shock is estimated to give long-lasting effects on output and consumption
compared with those in the previous studies for the U.S. and euro area.
Meanwhile, variance decomposition shows productivity shock and invest-
ment shock account for a large fraction of output fluctuation in long run
in contrast to Smets and Wouters (2003).
∗The authors are grateful to Kazumi Asako, Ippei Fujiwara, Satoru Kanoh, Munehisa Kasuya,
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, Tsutomu Miyagawa, Kosuke Oya, Takayuki Tsuruga and the participants in
the IMES seminar, Business Cycle Date Meeting in July 2005 and Contemporary Policy Studies
Conference in December 2005 for extremely valuable comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of the paper. The views represented in this paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan or the Bank of Canada. Any remaining errors are
the sole responsibility of the authors.
†Faculty of Economics, Kindai University
‡Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis, Bank of Canada
§Corresponding author: Toshiaki Watanabe, Institute for Monetary and Economics Studies,
Bank of Japan, 2-1-1, Nihonbashi-Hongokucho, Chuo-Ku, Tokyo, 103-8660, Japan, Phone:
+81-3-3277-3069 (direct); E-mail: toshiaki.watanabe@boj.or.jp
1
1 Introduction
After the publication of seminal work by Kydland and Prescott (1982), dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have become popular in
macroeconomics. One of the main advantages of DSGE models over macroe-
conometric models such as a vector autoregressive (VAR) model is that DSGE
models can identify various shocks in a theoretically consistent way since they
are structured from micro-foundation theories. Hence, DSGE models have
attracted the attention of policy makers as well as macroeconomists.
DSGE models have been developed as New-Keynesian DSGE models with
some market frictions. Among such New-Keynesian DSGE models, the most
successful is the one proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (CEE,
2005). They introduce (1) Calvo-style nominal price and wage for expressing
nominal rigidity, (2) habit formation in preference for consumption, (3) adjust-
ment costs in investment and (4) variable capital utilization. As a result, their
model has the ability to capture the time-series properties of macroeconomic
data equivalent to a VAR model and can successfully explain inertia in inflation
and persistence in output observed in the real world, which other macroeco-
nomic models such as a real business cycle (RBC) model cannot explain.
This paper estimates the CEE (2005) model for the Japanese economy. The
empirical applications of DSGE models have long been based on calibration
without formal statistical methods. It is recent that formal statistical meth-
ods have become to be applied to DSGE models and such applications are
still limited to the U.S. and euro economies. As far as we know, no studies
have applied DSGE models to the Japanese economy using a formal statistical
method. While CEE (2005) estimate their model using generalized methods of
moments (GMM), we employ Bayesian inference via Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) simulation following Smets and Wouters (2003), Onatski and Williams
(2004) and Levin et al. (2005). This method samples the parameters from their
posterior distribution and uses the sampled draws for parameter estimation.
The method used for sampling from the posterior distribution is MCMC, where
sampling is not random and depends on the draw obtained in the previous
sampling. Specifically, the random walk Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm,
which is one of MCMC, is used for sampling the parameters in DSGE mod-
els. Bayesian inference via MCMC has some advantages over other methods
such as GMM and maximum likelihood estimation. First, we can include prior
information coming from microeconometric or macroeconometric studies into
the prior distribution, which plays an important role for identifying shocks.
Second, we can sample not only the parameters but also their functions such
as impulse-response function from their posterior distribution. All we have
to do is to substitute the sampled parameter values into those functions. It
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enables us to estimate impulse-response function taking the parameter un-
certainty into consideration. Third, we may compare the DSGE models with
non-nested models such as a VAR model using the posterior odds ratio, which
is a usual tool for a Bayesian model comparison.
The data we use are the major seven macroeconomics quarterly series in
Japan: real GDP, consumption, investment, labor input, real wage, inflation
and nominal interest rate. As is well known, the zero interest rate bound
started at 1999:Q1 in Japan. It is plausible that the macroeconomic behavior
at the period of zero interest rate bound would be apart from the ordinary
economic situation. Accordingly, the sample period is limited over 1970:Q1
through 1998:Q4, which is prior to the period of zero interest rate bound.
The parameter estimates and impulse response functions of nine real and
nominal shocks such as monetary policy shock and productivity shock in the
Japanese economy are estimated to be quite consistent with the previous stud-
ies such as Onatski and Williams (2004) and Levin et al. (2005) for the U.S.
and Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area. For example, we find ev-
idence that the Japanese monetary authorities reacted very actively toward
inflation. Almost all shocks are estimated to give the reaction of all macroe-
conomic variables based on theoretical background. The only exception is
investment, whose adjustment cost is estimated huge and whose shock is es-
timated to give long-lasting effects on output and consumption compared with
those in the previous studies for the U.S. and euro area. On the other hand,
variance decomposition shows that monetary policy shock do not influence the
fluctuations of output and inflation in the long run, in contrast to Smets and
Wouters (2003). Instead, productivity shock and investment shock account for
a large fraction of all macroeconomic variables including output and inflation
in the long run.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
CEE model and the derivation of the log-linearized model to be estimated. Sec-
tion 3 explains the toolkit for estimating DSGE models such as the method for
solving a linear rational expectations model proposed by Sims (2002), Kalman
filter, Bayesian estimation and MCMC. Bayesian analysis of impulse response
function and variance decomposition is also described. Section 4 describes the
data used in the estimation. In Section 5, we present the estimation results of
parameters, impulse response functions and variance decomposition. Section
6 concludes the paper.
3
2 The Model
2.1 The Household/Investor Sector
2.1.1 Preference and Budget Constraint
The household assumed in this paper follows that of Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000) (hereafter EHL) and CEE (2005). Each continuum of households
are indexed by h ∈ (0, 1) and assumed to possess an identical preference toward
consumption and leisure. In particular, each household seeks to maximize the
following utility function;
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt uct
[
(ct(h)−Ht)1−σc
1− σc −
uLt lt(h)
1+σL
1 + σL
]
, (2.1)
where Ht = θct−1,
ct(h) stands for the real aggregate consumption of household h, Ht stands for
the external habit formation which is exogenously given to household h, and
lt(h) stands for the labor supplies of household h. Equation (2.1) also contains
two persistent shocks: uct denotes a preference shock and u
L
t denotes a shock
to labor supply. An additional assumption that the external habit stock Ht is
proportional to aggregate past consumption: Ht = θct−1, is introduced where θ
denotes the habit persistence parameter. Each household h supplies a differ-
entiated type of labor and, thus, decided to choose the amount of labor supply
lt(h) monopolistically in the labor market. Parameter β stands for the discount
rate, σc stands for the inverse of the long-run intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, and σL stands for labor supply elasticity. Following EHL and CEE,
we simply assume that ct(h) and lt(h) are additive-separable from each other.
Now, the household h faces the following budget constraint for each period;
Bt(h) + Pt [ct(h) + invt(h) + a(ut(h))Kt(h)] (2.2)
= Rt−1Bt−1(h) +Wt(h)lt(h) +Rkt K˜t(h) +Divt(h),
where Bt(h) stands for nominal bond holding by household h, Pt stands for
the price index of real aggregate consumption goods which is common to all
households, invt(h) stands for physical investment by household h, Rt−1 stands
for the gross nominal interest rate from period t−1 to period t, Wt(h) stands for
the nominal wage rate uniquely associated to the household h’s differentiated
labor supply, and Divt(h) stands for the nominal dividend income from the firm
that the household h owns. It should be noted that this dividend income is
already maximized by the firm and therefore it is exogenous to the household’s
optimization problem.
Now, some detailed explanations are necessary for the variable related to
the household’s capital holdings. Here, in this model, the household not only
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act as a consumer/labor supplier, but also possess a characteristic of an in-
vestor. In other words, the household h lends out the capital, Kt(h), to the firm
and earns rental rate Rkt from each effective capital, K˜t(h). Effective capital is
defined as the product of actual capital holdings and capital utilization rate;
K˜t(h) = ut(h)Kt(h). (2.3)
The household can increase the rental income by increasing the capital uti-
lization rate. However, in so doing, the household need to pay the cost of
capital utilization given by a(ut(h))Kt(h). Here, the utilization cost function
a(ut(h)) is assumed to be increasing and convex function – i.e., a′(u) > 0 and
a′′(u) > 0. Further, as in CEE, we assume the utilization cost to be zero when
capital utilization is at the steady state – i.e., a(uss) = 0 where uss = 1.
In sum, LHS of the budget constraint (2.2) represents the total expenditure
(bond investment, consumption expenditure, physical investment, and capital
utilization cost) of household h at period t and RHS of the budget constraint
represents the total revenue (bond carried over from period t−1, labor income,
rental income, and dividend income) of the household.
Transforming the nominal budget constraint (2.2) into the real budget con-
straint, we obtain the following constraint,
bt(h) + ct(h) + invt(h) + a(ut(h))Kt(h) (2.4)
=
Rt−1
Πt
bt−1(h) + wt(h)lt(h) + rkt ut(h)Kt(h) + divt(h),
where bt(h) = Bt(h)/Pt stands for real bond holdings, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 stands for
inflation rate from period t − 1 to t, wt(h) = Wt(h)/Pt stands for real wage,
rkt = R
k
t /Pt stands for real rental rate, and divt(h) = Divt(h)/Pt stands for real
dividend.
2.1.2 Capital Accumulation and Capital Adjustment Cost
In addition to the budget constraint laid out above, following Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Levin et al. (2005), the household accumulates the capital stock
according to the following capital accumulation equation;
Kt+1(h) = (1− δ)Kt(h) +
[
1− S
(uinvt invt(h)
invt−1(h)
)]
invt(h) (2.5)
where δ stands for depreciation rate of capital and function S(·) stands for
adjustment cost for capital defined as a quadratic function as follows.
S
(
invt(h)
invt−1(h)
)
=
1
ϕ
1
2
(
invt(h)
invt−1(h)
− 1
)2
. (2.6)
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As can be seen from the above specification, the bigger the deviation of the
current physical investment from the previous period, the higher the adjust-
ment cost. In other words, haphazard investment leads to a non-negligible
“leakage” in capital installment and, therefore, it will be in the interest of the
household to install the capital as smooth as possible to minimize the “leak-
age.” The existence of this capital adjustment cost creates a motivation for the
household to smooth out the physical investment over time. Also, it should
be noted that adjustment cost to be zero in steady state – i.e., S(1) = 0 and
S′(1) = 0. Further, notice that ϕ = 1/S′′(1) in steady state. Finally, a shock to
the investment cost function S(·): uinvt , is contained in equation (2.5).
2.1.3 Euler Conditions of the Household/Investor Sector
From this point forward, assuming that each household h is facing the same
initial condition and also assuming the complete state contingent commodity
market, we omit the notation of h except for wage and labor supply. Given the
budget constraint (2.4) and capital accumulation equation (2.5), the dynamic
optimization problem for the household h can be formulated as follows.
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtuct
{[
(ct −Ht)1−σc
1− σc −
uLt lt(h)
1+σL
1 + σL
]
+ λt
[
Rt−1
Πt
bt−1 + wt(h)lt(h) + rkt utKt + divt − bt − ct − invt − a(ut)Kt
]
+ qt
[
(1− τ)Kt +
[
1− S
(
uinvt invt
invt−1
)]
invt −Kt+1
]}
(2.7)
where λt stands for the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint
at period t and qt1 stands for the Lagrange multiplier attached to the capital ac-
cumulation equation. The household h seeks to maximize the utility over time
by choosing the current consumption, bond holdings, magnitude of capital uti-
lization, physical investment, and capital holdings. The decision regarding the
amount of labor supply requires a special treatment due to the assumption of
monopolistic competition in the labor market and will be analyzed separately.
The symmetric first order conditions associated with each control variable
1In CEE, SW, and LOWW, the Lagrange multiplier attached to capital accumulation con-
straint is defined as a product of shadow price of capital and shadow price of consumption
goods (i.e., λt in our context). Thus, the Lagrange multiplier and shadow price of capital is
strictly distinguished in their context. In our paper, for mechanical convenience, we continue
to use Lagrange multiplier, qt, without distinguishing it from shadow price of capital.
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ct, bt, ut, invt, and Kt will be as follows for any household h;
consumption: λt = (ct −Ht)−σc (2.8)
bond holdings: λt = βEt
[
Rt
Πt+1
λt+1
]
(2.9)
capital utilization: rkt = a
′(ut) (2.10)
physical investment: λt = qt
[
1− S
(
uinvt invt
invt−1
)
− S′
(
uinvt invt
invt−1
)
uinvt invt
invt−1
]
+ βEtqt+1
[
S′
(
uinvt+1 invt+1
invt
)(
uinvt invt+1
invt
)(
invt+1
invt
)]
(2.11)
capital holdings: qt = βEt
[
qt+1(1− τ) + λt+1
(
rkt+1ut+1 − a(ut+1)
)]
(2.12)
The first order conditions regarding consumption and bond holdings are quite
standard and, thus, we simply omit the explanation. Let us first turn to the
first order condition associated with the capital utilization. As can be seen
from equation (2.10), the optimality condition regarding capital utilization re-
quires the household to equalize the marginal cost of capital utilization to the
rental rate. By increasing capital utilization level marginally the household
can increase the income by rktKt, which can be considered as a marginal ben-
efit to the household. However, increase of the capital utilization comes with
a cost. By increasing the capital utilization, on the margin, the household
need to forgo a′(ut)Kt amount of consumption goods. Equalizing the marginal
benefit associated to capital utilization with marginal cost yields the first order
condition (2.10).
Next, turning to the first order condition associated with the physical in-
vestment, the LHS of equation (2.11) (i.e., λt) can be interpreted as the marginal
cost of investment. By investing one additional consumption goods, the
household need to forgo the same amount of consumption goods from his bud-
get. Since the shadow price of consumption goods is λt, λt will be the marginal
cost of investment. RHS of equation (2.11) basically represents the marginal
benefit of investment. By additional one unit of investment the household
can increase the amount of capital stock to some extent, but the magnitude of
increase in capital stock is reduced due to the “leakage” in capital installment.
This “leakage” of capital installment on the margin is represented by the term
inside the first bracket in equation (2.11). In addition, due to the specification
of the adjustment cost function (2.6), a marginal change of the current invest-
ment will also affect the next period’s adjustment cost and this extra effect is
represented by the term inside the second bracket in equation (2.11). Combin-
ing the “leakage” factor and “extra” effect and multiplying them by the shadow
price of capital each will, roughly speaking, constitute the marginal benefit
from additional investment. It should be noted that when the adjustment cost
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is constant, the first order condition associated with a physical investment will
reduce to λt = qt(1− S). Further, if there is no adjustment cost when forming
the capital, the first order condition will trivially reduce to λt = qt, which says
that marginal cost of investment will be equal to the shadow price of capital.
Finally, equation (2.12) represents the first order condition associated with
the capital holdings. Roughly speaking, shadow price of capital, qt, on the LHS
of equation (2.12) stands for the marginal cost of adding one unit of capital at
period t. In return, the household can expect to increase (1− τ) unit of capital
at next period and, thus, βEtqt+1(1− τ) can be considered as a present-valued
marginal benefit of adding one unit of capital. However, it should be noted
that there is also a side-effect from increasing capital. That is, by increasing
the amount of capital, the household can expect to earn additional income via
capital lending. This increase of income via capital lending is represented by
rkt+1ut+1 in equation (2.12). Of course, this additional capital lending comes
with additional capital utilization cost and this is represented by a(ut+1) in
equation (2.12). Taking into these side-effect, the whole picture of the first
order condition associated with the capital holding becomes to be equation
(2.12).
2.1.4 Wage Setting and Labor Supply Behavior
In modeling household behavior in setting the wage, we basicaly follow EHL.
Each continuum of household h is monopolistic supplier of differentiated labor,
lt(h), and act as a wage setter in the labor market. Then, each differetiated
labor supply is bundled into aggregate labor supply, lt, accoriding to Dixit-
Stiglitz type aggregator function.2 By the same token, the wage levels that
have been set by each household are also aggregated via Dixit-Stiglitz type
aggregator function to yield the aggregate nominal wage, Wt.3
In contrast, the firm will act as a wage-taker in the labor market and the
labor demand funtion for differentiated labor lt(h) is given as
lt(h) =
(
wt(h)
Wt
)−(1+λw)/λw
Lt
where wt(h) is the wage of differentiated labor supplied by household h and
2Following EHL, the aggregate labor supply lt is defined as below,
lt =
[∫ 1
0
lt(h)
1/1+λwdh
]1+λw
.
3Again, following EHL, the aggregate nominal wage index Wt is defined as
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
wt(h)
−1/λwdh
]−λw
.
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λw is the parameter governing the wage elasticity of labor demand. As it will
be evident later, the parameter λw will be the wage markup over the marginal
disutility of labor by household h. Taking this labor demand into account,
the household h will monopolistically set the wage and also decide how much
differentiated labor to supply.
In addition to the above monopolistic labor supply structure, following EHL,
we introduce Calvo-Yun type sticky price environment for the wage setting
problem. In particular, for any given period t, fraction of ξw of the entire
households in the economy will not be able to revise their wage wt(h), while
fraction of (1 − ξw) will have a chance to revise their wage. For any given
chance to revise the wage wt(h), each household seeks to maximize the follow-
ing objective funtion;
max
wt(h)
Et
∞∑
i=0
[
βiξiw
(
λt+i
wt(h)
pt+i
lt+i(wt(h))− lt+i(wt (h))
1+σl
1 + σl
)]
.
By supplying the labor, the household will expect to earn a real labor income of
wt (h) lt+i (h) /pt+i for period t+i. Here, it should be noted that wage as of period
t will stay at the same level during a spell of wage stickiness and cannot be
revised until a household receive the next wage changing signal. A real labor
income, whose unit is aggregate consumption goods, is converted to utility
unit by multiplying marginal utility of real income – i.e., λt+i. Subtracting
the labor disutility from “labor utility” yields the period-by-period net utility
from labor. For any given chance to revise the wage, each household then
maximize the expeted present value of the stream of net utility with respect to
the nominal wage.
The FOC of the above problem will be as follows,4
Et
∞∑
i=o
βiξiwλt+iLt+iW
(1+λw)/λw
t+i
[
w∗t
pt+i
− (1 + λw) lt+i(h)
σl
λt+i
]
= 0. (2.13)
Further rearranging the above equation, we obtain the following relationship
between the currrent real wage and the future stream of marginal rate of sub-
4As a special case of ξw = 0 where every household is able to revise their wage every period, it
should be noted that the FOC (2.13) reduces to the standard intratemporal FOC without wage
stickiness;
w∗t
pt
= (1 + λw)
lt(h)
σl
λt
.
In other words, being able to set the wage each period, a household will set the real wage equal
to markup over the marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and consumption.
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stitution (MRS) between labor and consumption goods,
w∗t
pt
= (1 + λw)Et
∞∑
i=0
fwt+i
pt+i
pt
lt+i(h)
σl
λt+i
(2.14)
where fwt+i ≡
βiξiwLt+iW
(1+λw)/λw
t+i
Et
∑∞
i=0 β
iξiwLt+iW
(1+λw)/λw
t+i
.
Thus, as can be seen from the above relationship, the optimal wage is set
equal to the weighted average of future stream of MRS between labor and
consumption goods marked up by the factor (1 + λw). Here, if the degree
of wage stickiness is high (i.e., ξw is high), then the household will take into
account the stream of MRS far into the future when setting the wage at period
t. In contrast, if the degree of wage stickiness is low (i.e., ξw is low), then the
household will be relatively shortsighted when setting the wage putting less
emphasis on the future MRS. It is also useful to see the effect of inflation on
the wage setting behavior. Suppose, in a partial equilibrium environment, a
household is expecting a higher inflation in the future at period t. Then, as
can be seen from equation (2.14), the future expected aggregate price index
pt+i will be higher that the household will put larger emphasis on the stream
of MRS, ceteris paribus. Assuming that the effect of inflation do no affect the
stream of MRS, aggregate labor demand, and aggregate wage index (which of
course is not a plausible assumption in a general equilibrium setting), this will
imply a higher wage at period t compared to the scenario where infaltion stays
calm. Thus, higher expected inflation in the future will induce a household
to set higher wage which, in turn, causes an inflation in the aggregate wage
index.
For the sake of simplicity, we have so far, the above optimal wage setting
rule was derived under the assumption that there is no wage indexation. Fol-
lowing CEE and SW and in order to model the persistence in nominal wage
inflation, we introduce the partial indexation of nominal wage to price index.
Under the scheme of partial wage indexation, the household who did not re-
ceive a “wage change signal” at period t will partially adjust their nominal wage
taking into account the past inflation rate. Specifically, the partial indexation
rule takes the following form,
wage indexation to inflation: w˜t = Π
γw
t−1w˜t−1, (2.15)
where parameter γw controls the magnitude5 of indexation to the past inflation.
Under the wage indexation, the optimal wage setting rule will be modified as
5When γw = 1, the household who did not receive a “wage change signal” at period t will
index their nominal wage to past inflation as in CEE. In contrast, when γw = 0, there is no
wage indexation to past inflation and so the household who did not receive a signal will withold
to the nominal wage set previously.
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following,
Et
∞∑
i=o
βiξiwλt+iLt+iW
(1+λw)/λw
t+i
[
w˜t
pt+i
(
pt−1+i
pt−1
)γw
− (1 + λw) lt+i(h)
σl
λt+i
]
= 0, (2.16)
where w˜t stands for the optimal wage set by the household at period t and
this wage will be automatically adjusted next period according to the wage
indexation formula specified in equation (2.15).
Finally, from the definition of the aggregate wage index, the law of motion
of the aggregate wage can be expressed as follows,
W
−1/λw
t = ξw
[
Wt
(
pt−1
pt−2
)γw]−1/λw
+ (1− ξw)w˜−1/λwt .
2.2 The Firm Sector
2.2.1 Production Technology and Cost Minimization
In modeling the firms behavior, we basically follow Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)
type treatment. There are n monopolistically competitive firms each producing
and selling disaggregated good, yj,t, in the intermediate goods market. Fol-
lowing CEE, the production function for each monopolistic firms is identically
defined as,
production function: yj,t = uat K˜
α
j,t l
1−α
j,t − Φ (2.17)
where uat is the economy-wide technology shock affecting the productivity of
all firms, K˜j,t stands for the borrowing of effective capital by the firm j, lj,t
stands for the aggregate labor force employed by the firm j at period t, and Φ
stands for the fixed cost. Notice that due to the existence of fixed cost inside
the production function (2.17), a firm’s production technology is no longer
constant return-to-scale, but it will be increasing return-to-scale technology.6
Now by the assumption of perfectly competitive rental market for capital
and since a firm behaves to be a price-taker in the labor market, the firm j
takes the rental price rkt and real wage index wt as given. Provided the target
output level yj,t, the cost minimization problem for the firm j can be expressed
as follows.
cost function: min
K˜j,t,lj,t
wtlj,t + r
k
t K˜j,t +mcj,t
(
yj,t − uat K˜αj,t l1−αj,t + Φ
)
, (2.18)
6As for another type of IRS specification in the DSGE literature, Tsuruga (2005) proposed
to use the dynamic externality in production technology. In particular, without assuming the
inflation indexation such as in CEE, Tsuruga (2005) showed that the impulse response func-
tion of inflation can be humped-shaped when there is a dynamic externality in the production
technology.
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where Lagrange multiplier, mcj,t, has an interpretation of the marginal cost of
producing yj,t. Solving the above cost minimization, the first order condition
becomes
wt
rkt
=
1− α
α
K˜j,t
lj,t
(2.19)
where LHS of equation (2.19) stands for the opportunity cost between the cap-
ital input and labor input and RHS stands for the marginal rate of technical
substitution between two factors. Further, the firm j’s marginal cost can be
expressed as
marginal cost: mcj,t =
1
uat
(
α−α(1− α)−(1−α)
)
w1−αt (r
k
t )
α. (2.20)
As can be seen from equation (2.20), the specification of marginal cost does
not depend on subscript j which implies that the marginal cost is symmetric
across firms. This is because of the identical specification of the production
function and price-taking behavior of firms in the capital market and aggre-
gate labor market. Since marginal cost is symmetric across firms, we simply
suppress subscript j from this point forward.
2.2.2 Optimal Pricing Rule under Sticky Price
Here, we investigate the optimal setting behavior of the firm j who behaves mo-
nopolistically in the intermediate goods market for yj,t. Before investigating
the optimal pricing rule, we need to specify the demand function for interme-
diate goods yj,t. Following the literature, we specify the intermediate good
demand function to be a standard one as follows.7
demand function for yj,t: yj,t =
(
Pj,t
Pt
)−(1+λp)/λp
yt (2.21)
where yt stands for final goods,8 Pt stands for aggregate price index of final
goods yt,9 and λp is a parameter governing the price elasticity of demand and
stands for the firm’s markup over the marginal cost. Under Calvo (1983) -
Yun (1996) type sticky price setting, for any given period t, fraction ξp of the
7For the derivation of the intermediate goods demand function, see for instance Woodford
(2003).
8Following the literature, the final good yt is produced using the intermediate goods yj,t and
is defined as follows.
yt =
[∫ 1
0
y
1/(1+λp)
j,t dj
]1+λp
.
For more details, see Woodford (2003).
9Again, following the literature, the aggregate price index Pt is defined as
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P
−1/λp
j,t dj
]−λp
.
For more details, see Woodford (2003).
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entire firms in the economy will not be able to revise their price pj,t, whereas
fraction (1 − ξp) will have a chance to revise their price. Now, for any given
chance to revise the price pj,t, the individual firm is faced with the following
profit maximization problem.
profit function: max
Pj,t
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi ξip
[(
Pj,t
Pt+i
)−1/λp
−mct+i
(
Pj,t
Pt+i
)−(1+λp)/λp]
yt+i.
(2.22)
The first order condition for the above profit maximization problem yields
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi ξip yj,t+i
[
Pj,t
Pt+i
− (1 + λp) mct+i
]
= 0. (2.23)
Rearranging further yields the following optimal pricing rule for firm j.
Pj,t
Pt
= (1 + λp)Et
∞∑
i=0
ft+imct+i (2.24)
where ft+i =
βiξip(Pt+i/Pt)
(1+λp)/λpyj,t+i∑∞
i=0 β
iξip(Pt+i/Pt)
1/λpyj,t+i
.
Thus, as can be seen from equation (2.24) the firm will set their price equal to
the weighted average of the stream of future marginal costs marked up by the
factor (1 + λp). Notice that, in the case of flexible price setting, the firm will
set the price over the current marginal cost marked up by the factor (1 + λp),
whereas, in the case of sticky price setting such as here, the firm who has a
chance to revise their price at period t will set the price taking into account
the current and future stream of expected marginal costs. If the degree of
price stickiness is high (i.e., ξp is high), then the firm will take into account the
future marginal costs far into the future when setting the price. On the other
hand, if the degree of price stickiness is low (i.e., ξp is low), then the firm will
be relatively shortsighted when considering the future marginal costs. As for
the extreme case, when all the firms have a chance to revise their prices every
period (i.e., ξp = 0), the pricing rule will reduce to flexible equilibrium pricing
rule.
Now, in order to keep the exposition simple, the above pricing rule was
derived under the assumption that firms that did not receive the “price-change
signal” to keep their price unchanged from last period. In CEE and SW, in
order to model the inflation persistence, they introduce, albeit in an ad-hoc
way, a partial indexation to inflation. In other words, firms that did not
have a chance to reoptimize their price will partially index their price to lagged
inflation as follows.
price indexation to inflation: p˜j,t =
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp
p˜j,t−1, (2.25)
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where parameter γp controls the magnitude of indexation10 to the past infla-
tion. Under this price indexation, the optimal pricing rule will be modified as
follows.
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi ξip yj,t+i
[
p˜j,t
Pt+i
(
Pt−1+i
Pt−1
)γp
− (1 + λp) mct+i
]
= 0, (2.26)
where p˜j,t stands for the optimal price chosen by the optimizing firm at pe-
riod t. It should be noted that this price p˜j,t will be automatically adjusted
next period according to the indexation specified in equation (2.25), even if
the firm does not receive a “price-changing signal”. Taking a close look at
equation (2.26) and comparing it with the pricing rule without indexation, we
notice the presence of modifying term, (Pt−1+i/Pt−1)γp. Assuming the trend of
positive inflation, the presence of this modifying term will render the optimal
price p˜j,t to be lower compared to the case where there is no price indexation
as in equation (2.23) – i.e., p˜j,t < Pj,t. Thanks to the automatic price adjust-
ment mechanism even for a period without a “price-changing signal,” a firm
is protected from a loss caused by an inflation and, thus, does not need to
charge an “inflation premium” when setting a price at period t. In contrast,
if there is no automatic price adjustment mechanism as in Yun (1996), then
a firm need to take into account for the risk of future inflation and, therefore,
need to charge “inflation premium” when setting the price at period t. This
is the reason why the optimal price with inflation index will be lower than the
case without inflation index.11
Finally, from the definition of the aggregate price index, the law of motion
of the aggregate price index can be shown to be as follows.
P
−1/λp
t = ξp
[
Pt−1
(
Pt−1
Pt−2
)γp]−1/λp
+ (1− ξp)p˜−1/λpj,t . (2.27)
2.3 Market Clearing Condition
We impose the market clearing condition for the final goods market. We
require the supply of final goods to be equal to the demand of final goods
for consumption, investment, capital utilization, and government expenditure.
Thus, the market clearing condition can be expressed as follows.
yt = ct + invt + a(ut)Kt−1 + gt. (2.28)
10When γp = 1, firms that do not reoptimize will simply index their price to past inflation.
This specification was adopted by CEE. Notice that when γp = 0, there is no indexation to past
inflation and, therefore, firms that do not reoptimize will simply set the price equal to past price
as in Yun (1996).
11Again, this argument assumes the trend of positive inflation. For the economy where
deflation is prevailing, the argument needs to be reversed, discussing the issue of “deflation
discount” – i.e., p˜j,t > Pj,t.
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2.4 Log-Linearization of the Model
For the sake of Bayesian estimation, which requires the model to be in the
linear state-space form, we log-linearize the above model around the steady
state. Without laboring on the derivation of the steady states and the log-
linearization, we simply state the results from Smets and Wouters (2003) and
Onatski and Williams (2004) here. The hat above a variable denotes log deriva-
tion from steady state: i.e. xˆ = lnx− lnxss where xss is steady state.
2.4.1 Equilibrium Conditions from Housing/Investor Sector
(1) Consumption Euler equation:
cˆt =
θ
1 + θ
cˆt−1+
1
1 + θ
Etcˆt+1− 1− θ
(1 + θ)σc
(Rˆt−EtΠˆt+1)+ 1− θ
(1 + θ)σc
(uct−Etuct+1), (2.29)
When h = 0, equation (2.29) reduces to the traditional forward-looking con-
sumption equation. With external habit formation, consumption depends on
a weighted average of past and expected future consumption. Note that in this
case the interest elasticity of consumption depends not only on the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (σc), but also on habit persistence parameter. A
high degree of habit persistence will tend to reduce the impact of the real rate
on consumption for a given elasticity of substitution. A persistent shock uct is
AR(1) process with coefficient ρc, and, therefore, the expected value Etuct+1 can
be rewritten as ρcuct .
(2) Investment Euler equation
învt =
1
1 + β
învt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etînvt+1 +
ϕ
1 + β
qˆt +
β
1 + β
(Etu
inv
t+1 − uinvt ) (2.30)
where we set ϕ = 1/S¯′′ and the inverse, 1/ϕ, implies the elasticity of investment
on the price of capital. Modeling the capital adjustment cost as a function of
the change in investment rather than its level introduces additional dynamics
in the investment equation, which is useful in capturing the hump-shaped re-
sponse of investment to various shocks including monetary policy shocks. A
positive shock to the adjustment cost function, uinvt , temporarily reduces in-
vestment. The expected value Etuinvt+1 is set as ρ
invuinvt using AR(1) coefficient
ρinv.
(3) Asset Pricing Euler equation:
qˆt = −(Rˆt − EtΠˆt+1) + 1− τ
1− τ + rkEtqˆt+1 +
rk
1− τ + rkEtrˆ
k
t+1 + ε
q
t (2.31)
where β = 1/(1− τ − r¯k), τ is the depreciation rate, and r¯k is steady-state rental
rate. The current value of the capital stock, qt, depends negatively on the ex
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ante real interest rate, and positively on its expected future value and the ex-
pected rental rate. The introduction of a white noise shock to the required rate
of return on equity investment, εqt , is meant as a shortcut to capture changes
in the cost of capital that may be due to stochastic variations in the external
finance premium.
(4) Real wage law of motion:
wˆt =
β
1 + β
Etwˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
EtΠˆt+1 − 1 + βγw
1 + β
Πˆt +
γw
1 + β
Πˆt−1 (2.32)
− λw(1− βξw)(1− ξw)
(1 + β)(λw + (1 + λw)σL)ξw
[
wˆt − σL lˆt − σc
1− θ (cˆt − θcˆt−1)− u
L
t − εwt
]
The real wage, wˆt, is a function of expected and past real wages and the ex-
pected, current, and past inflation rate where the relative weight depends on
the degree of indexation of the nonoptimized wages, γw. When γw = 0, real
wages do not depend on the lagged inflation rate. The last term implies a neg-
ative effect of the deviation of the actual real wage from the wage that would
prevail in a flexible labor market. The size of this effect will be greater, the
smaller the degree of wage rigidity, the lower the demand elasticity for labor
and the lower the inverse elasticity of labor supply, σL. The shock to labor
supply, uLt , follows the AR(1) process, while the shock to real wage, ε
w
t , is as-
sumed to obey i.i.d-normal.
(5) Capital Accumulation equation:
Kˆt = (1− τ)Kˆt−1 + τ învt−1 (2.33)
Capital, Kt, is decreased by the depreciation of capital and increased by in-
vestment. Note that τ is a double meaning: the depreciation rate of capital
and the ratio of investment to capital so that the former are used in the first
term of RHS and the latter is used in the second term.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Conditions from Firm Sector
(6) Cost minimization condition:
lˆt = −wˆt + (1 + ψ)rˆkt + Kˆt−1 (2.34)
where ψ = ψ′(1)/ψ′′(1) is the inverse of elasticity of the capital utilization cost
function. For a given installed capital stock, labor demand depends negatively
on the real wage, wˆt, and positively on the rental rate of capital, rˆkt .
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(7) Production Function:
yˆt = φuˆ
a
t + φαKˆt−1 + φαψrˆ
k
t + φ(1− α)lˆt (2.35)
where φ is one plus the share of the fixed cost in production, and uˆat is produc-
tivity shock. This equation is derived from the production function (2.17).
(8) Inflation law of motion:
Πˆt =
β
1 + βγp
EtΠˆt+1 +
γp
1 + βγp
Πˆt−1 +
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)
(1 + βγp)ξp
[
αrˆkt + (1− α)wˆt − uat + εpt
]
(2.36)
Inflation, Πˆt, depends on past and expected future inflation and the current
marginal cost, which itself is a function of the rental rate on capital rˆt, the
real wage wˆt, and productivity shock uat . When γp = 0, this equation reduces
to the standard purely forward-looking Phillips curve. In the other words, the
degree of indexation, γp, determines how backward looking the inflation pro-
cess is. The elasticity of inflation with respect to changes in the marginal cost,[
αrˆkt + (1− α)wˆt − uat + εpt
]
, depends mainly on the degree of price stickiness.
When all prices are flexible (ξp = 0) and the i.i.d-normal price-markup shock,
εpt , is zero, this equation reduces to the normal condition that in a flexible price
economy the real marginal cost should equal one.
(9) Employment equation:
eˆt = βeˆt+1 +
(1− βξe)(1− ξe)
ξe
(lˆt − eˆt) (2.37)
where et is employment, lt is labor input, and ξe is a constant probability at
which firms are able to adjust employment to its desired total labor input. This
equation reflects the fact that the employment is likely to respond more slowly
than the labor input. Smets and Wouters (2003) and Onatski and Williams
(2004) transformed labor input, lt, from employment,et, using equation (2.37)
since only the employment is available as data but not the labor input which
is derived from total hours worked. However, we do not need to adopt equation
(2.37), because we use instead labor input as data.
2.4.3 Miscellaneous Equilibrium Conditions
(10) Market clearing conditions:
yˆt = (1− τky − gy)cˆt + τky învt + rktψky rˆkt + gyugt (2.38)
where ky is the steady state capital-output ratio, and gy is the steady state
government spending-output ratio. We assume that the government spending
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shock follows a first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d-normal error
term: ugt = ρ
gugt−1 + ε
g
t .
(11) Monetary policy rule:
Rˆt = ρmRˆt−1 + (1− ρm)
[
µpiΠˆt−1 + µyyˆt
]
+ εmt (2.39)
The monetary authorities follow a generalized Taylor rule by gradually re-
sponding to deviations of lagged inflation from a zero-percent inflation objec-
tive and the lagged output gap, yˆt. The parameter ρm captures the degree of
interest rate smoothing. Also we assume monetary policy shock, εmt , follows
a white noise process. Smets and Wouters (2003) and Onatski and Williams
(2004) adopted the more complicated rule as equation (2.39’). This rule, fur-
thermore, considered a short-run feedback from the current changes in infla-
tion and output gap and non-zero inflation target, pi∗.
Rˆt = ρmRˆt−1+(1−ρm)
[
pi∗t + µpi(Πˆt−1 − pi∗t ) + µyyˆt
]
+µ∆pi(Πˆt−Πˆt−1)+µ∆y(yˆt−yˆt−1)+εmt
(2.39’)
2.4.4 Persistent Shocks and Forecast Errors
The five persistent shocks built in above equations are characterized by the
first-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d-normal error term as follows.
(12) preference shock:
uct = ρ
cuct−1 + ε
c
t , (2.40)
(13) investment shock:
uinvt = ρ
invuinvt−1 + ε
inv
t , (2.41)
(14) labor shock:
uLt = ρ
LuLt−1 + ε
L
t , (2.42)
(15) productivity shock:
uat = ρ
zuat−1 + ε
a
t , (2.43)
(16) government spending shock:
ugt = ρ
gugt−1 + ε
g
t . (2.44)
And there are six forecast errors in the model as below.
(17) Inflation forecast error:
ηpit = pˆit − Et−1pˆit, (2.45)
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(18) Real wage forecast error:
ηwt = wˆt − Et−1wˆt, (2.46)
(19) Equity premium forecast error:
ηqt = qˆt − Et−1qˆt, (2.47)
(20) Investment forecast error:
ηinvt = învt − Et−1învt, (2.48)
(21) Consumption forecast error:
ηct = cˆt − Et−1cˆt, (2.49)
(22) Rental Rate forecast error:
ηrkt = rˆ
k
t − Et−1rˆkt . (2.50)
2.4.5 System of the Log-Linearized Model
From equations (2.29) through (2.50) except (2.37), the system of the log-
linearized model neighborhood the steady state are integrated as
Γ0st = Γ1st−1 + Ψεt + Πηt, (2.51)
where st is a vector of endogenous variables: st = [yt, pit, wt, kt, invt, ct, Rt, rkt , Lt,
Etpit+1Etwt+1, Etwt+1, Etqt+1, Etinvt+1, Etct+1, Etr
k
t+1, u
c
t , u
inv
t , u
L
t , u
a
t , u
g
t ]
′, and εt is a
vector of exogenous shocks: εt = [εct , ε
inv
t , ε
q
t , ε
L
t , ε
w
t , ε
a
t , ε
p
t , ε
g
t , ε
m
t ]
′. ηt is a vector of
forecast errors: ηt = [ηpit , η
w
t , η
q
t , η
inv
t , η
c
t , η
rk
t ]
′. Γ0, Γ1, Ψ, and Π are the matrices
of parameters. See Appendix A3 in which these matrices are described in
detail. The next section describes how to solve and estimate the DSGE model
using equation (2.51).
3 Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Models
In this section, we explain how to solve the DSGE model and the MCMC based
Bayesian method for the analysis of the DSGE model. For readers interested in
the developing field, we explain these methods in much more detail compared
with the previous literature.
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3.1 Solving DSGE model
3.1.1 General Form of Linear Rational Expectation Model
A linear rational expectations model (hereafter, LRE model) proposed by Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980) has been the representative of LRE models 12. Nowa-
days, Sims (2002), however, generalized their linear rational expectations model13.
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) do not explicitly build one-step-ahead prediction
errors of endogenous variables in LRE models by setting these errors as zero
(i.e. these endogenous variables are treated as predetermined ones.), whereas
Sims (2002) do explicitly build the one-step-ahead prediction errors in the
models 14. The solving methods are characterized by whether the errors are
built in the model or not. 15 The method proposed by Klein (2000) based
on Blanchard and Kahn (1980) is adopted by Otrok(2001) and DeJong et al
(2000a,b) etc, the Sims (2002) method is adopted by Schorfheide (2000), and
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).
The LRE model used in Sims (2002) can be represented as
Γ0st = Γ1st−1 + Ψεt + Πηt, (3.1)
where st is a vector of endogenous variables, εt is a vector of exogenous shock
variables, and ηt is a vector of one-step-ahead prediction errors (or rational
expectations errors), satisfying E(ηt+1) = 0.
The vector st denotes the variables in the model with the more advanced
subindices, as well as the conditional expectations in the model. All of them
12Klein (2000) takes over from the form which builds no endogenous prediction error in the
DSGE model used by Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
13This section follows the work by Novales et al. (1999)
14According to Sims (2002, pp.1-2), there are four advantages of the method as follows. (1)
It covers all of the linear models with endogenous prediction error. (2) The approach han-
dles automatically situations where linear combinations of variables are predetermined, while
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) require that the analyst specifies which elements of endogenous
variables are predetermined. (3) This approach makes an extension to continuous time possi-
ble. (4) Blanchard and Kahn (1980) assume that boundary conditions at infinity are given in the
form of maximal rate of growth for any element of the endogenous variables. Meanwhile, this
approach recognizes that in general only certain linear combinations of variables are required
to grow at bounded rates and that different linear combinations may have different growth rate
restrictions.
15Following Klein (2000, p1407), Sims (2002) transforms the LRE model into a triangular one
using the Schur decomposition described above and isolates the unstable block of equations.
This block is solved forward, and the endogenous prediction error process is solved for by
imposing the informational restriction that the solution must be adapted to the given filtration.
At this stage, no extraneous assumption (e.g. what variables are predetermined.) are invoked.
all information about the solution is given in the coefficient matrices of the difference equation
itself. Meanwhile, following Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Klein (2000) solves the unstable block
of the triangular system forward without having to solve for prediction error separately. Instead,
the endogenous prediction error process is solved for when solving the stable block of equations
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are determined in the model. The vector εt denotes variables which are de-
termined outside the model such as demand shocks, supply shocks, or errors
in controlling government policy variables. The vector ηt denotes prediction
errors, which will be solved for endogenously, together with state and decision
variables st in the model.
As mentioned above, the features of Sims’ (2002) model are that conditional
expectation is defined as the endogenous variables st and that the prediction
errors ηt are built in the LRE model. And if a stability condition does not hold
in equation (3.1), the vector of endogenous variables st always traces unsta-
ble path which will violate the transversality conditions under arbitrary initial
conditions s0 and sample realizations for εt. However, st converges to equilib-
rium by necessity, if the stability condition holds in the model (3.1), although
the structure of the stability conditions are generally model-specific. The lin-
ear combinations of prediction errors, ηt, which are endogenously determined
in the models as explained later, contribute to the setup of the stability condi-
tions.
Note that Sims (2002) proposed two approaches to find the solution and
the stable condition depending on the property of the matrix Γ0. In general,
the second method, however, is more commonly used regardless of this prop-
erty. In the case that the matrix Γ0 is invertible, the first method is applied. In
the method, we can find the eigenvalues Λ of Γ−10 Γ1(= PΛP−1) using Jordan
decomposition. Then we get the recursive equilibrium law of motion which
will thread out stable path consisting of the stable eigenvalues and their cor-
responding eigenvectors. Meanwhile, in the case that the matrix Γ0 is not
invertible, i.e, it is singular, the second method is applied. In the method, we
need to compute the generalized eigenvalues of the pair (Γ0,Γ1) using Schur
decomposition (or QZ decomposition) as explained in the next subsection.
3.1.2 Solving DSGE model by Schur decomposition
In this section, we deal with the solving method of DSGE model by Schur
decomposition (or QZ decomposition) 16. When sampling parameters in the
underlying DSGE model as explained in the next section, whether the models
specified by sampled parameter set traces on stable path or on unstable path,
is judged by this method. Only parameter sets in which the model traces on
stable path are saved and otherwise are removed from the sample.
In the LRE model, equation (3.1), explained in the last subsection such as
Γ0st = Γ1st−1 + Ψεt + Πηt,
16This subsection follows Sims (2002).
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the matrix Γ0 and Γ1 are decomposed by QZ decomposition as below.
Q′ΛZ ′ = Γ0,
Q′ΩZ ′ = Γ1,
where Q′Q = Z ′Z = I, and Q and Z are both possibly complex. Also Ω and Λ are
possibly complex and upper triangular. Note that the above QZ decomposition
always exists. Letting ωt = Z ′st,, and premultiplying the both side of equation
(3.1) by Q, then we get
Λωt = Ωωt−1 +QΨεt +QΠηt. (3.2)
Although QZ decomposition is not unique, the ratio of diagonal elements
of Ω and Λ, {ωii/λii}, which is referred to generalized eigenvalue, is generally
unique. The matrix Ω and Λ are ordered with respect to the absolute value
of the ratio {ωii/λii} (or generalized eigenvalue) by ascending order. By parti-
tioning equation (3.2) in two blocks so that the stable generalized eigenvalues
corresponding to |ωii/λii| < ξ¯ and the unstable generalized eigenvalue corre-
sponding to |ωii/λii| ≥ ξ¯, it is rewritten as equation (3.3). The upper and the
lower in equation (3.3) are the stable block and the unstable block, respec-
tively. Here, ξ¯ is the bound of maximal growth rate of endogenous variables st,
that holds the transversality condition.
[
Λ11 Λ12
0 Λ22
][
ωS(t)
ωU (t)
]
=
[
Ω11 Ω12
0 Ω22
][
ωS(t− 1)
ωU (t− 1)
]
+
[
Q1·
Q2·
](
Ψε(t) + Πη(t)
)
.
(3.3)
where Q1· and Q2· denote the first and the second rows of the matrix Q. For
canceling out the term of expectation errors η(t) from equation (3.3), we pre-
multiply equation (3.3) by [I − Φ] and translate its stable block into the
upper of equation (3.4). Note that Φ is set to satisfy a linear combination,
Q1·Π = ΦQ2·Π, and this linear combination of expectation errors η(t) is the
stability condition of the DSGE model.
Meanwhile, on the unstable block (i.e. the lower) in equation (3.3), the last
term, Q2·Πηt+1, is solved forward17, and then it becomes Q2·Πηt+1 =
∑∞
s=1M
s−1Ω−122 Q2·Ψt+s.
Here, we set M = Ω−122 Λ22. Substituting it into equation (3.3), we get[
Λ11 Λ12 − ΦΛ22
0 I
][
ωS(t)
ωU (t)
]
=
[
Ω11 Ω12 − ΦΩ22
0 0
][
ωS(t− 1)
ωU (t− 1)
]
+
[
Q1· − ΦQ2·
0
]
Ψε(t) + Et
[
0∑∞
s=1M
s−1Ω−122 Q2·Ψεt+s
]
(3.4)
17This derivation is described in Sims (2002). Here, we omit it since this calculation is not
used in the later part of our study.
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Here, we set Et(εt+s) = 0 for s = 1 · · ·T in the last term of equation (3.4) and
remind that ωt = Z ′st, then we get the recursive equilibrium law of motion such
as equation (3.5).
st = Θ1st−1 + Θ0εt, (3.5)
where
Θ1 = Z·1Λ−111 [Ω11 (Ω12 − ΦΩ22)]Z,
Θ0 = H
[
Q1· − ΦQ2·
0
]
Ψ,
H = Z
[
Λ−111 −Λ−111 (Λ12 − ΦΛ22)
0 I
]
Z,
where Z·1 denotes the first column of matrix Z. Equation (3.5) traces the
stable path converging to the equilibrium and corresponds to our target, say,
the solution of the DSGE models.
From equation (3.5), we set a state space model which consists of a tran-
sition equation and a measurement equation using Θ1 and Θ0 as below. The
transition equation (or recursive equilibrium law of motion) is given by
st = Θ1st−1 + Θ0εt, (3.6a)
And the measurement equation is given by
yt = Ast, (3.6b)
where, yt is a vector of observed variables, st is a vector of endogenous vari-
ables. A is a n × k matrix expressing relations between observed variables yt
and unobserved variables st.
For this state space model with Gaussian error terms, unobservable vari-
ables st and the likelihood of the model are obtained using Kalman filter. In
the next subsection, the Bayesian estimation for the state space model with
the recursive equilibrium law of motion is explained.
3.2 Bayesian Inference via MCMC Simulation
3.2.1 Likelihood of DSGE models
Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) constitute a linear Gaussian state space model,
whose likelihood can be evaluated using the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter
is the algorithm that provides the mean and the covariance matrix of the state
vector st (t = 1, . . . , T ) conditional on the observations up to t, i.e., (y1, · · · ,yt)
in a linear Gaussian state space model (see Harvey 1989 and Durbin and
Koopman 2001 for a detailed discussion of the Kalman filter).
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In the model that consists of equations (3.6a) and (3.6b), the equations of
the Kalman filter are:
One-Step-Ahead Prediction:
st|t−1 = Θ1st−1|t−1, (3.7)
Pt|t−1 = Θ1Pt−1|t−1Θ′1 + Θ0Θ
′
0, (3.8)
Updating:
st|t = st|t−1 + Pt|t−1A′Ft−1νt, (3.9)
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1A′Ft−1APt|t−1, (3.10)
where st|t−1 is the mean of st conditional on (y1, · · · ,yt−1), st|t is the mean
of st conditional on (y1, · · · ,yt), Pt|t−1 is the covariance matrix of (st − st|t−1),
and Pt|t is the covariance matrix of (st − st|t). νt is the prediction error vector
defined by
νt = yt −Ast|t−1, (3.11)
and Ft is its covariance matrix, given by
Ft = APt|t−1A′. (3.12)
Once the initial values of st|t−1 and Pt|t−1 are given, equations (3.7)–(3.12)
can be solved recursively. Those initial values are usually set equal to the
unconditional mean and covariance matrix of the state vector, i.e.,
s1|0 = E (st) = 0, (3.13)
vec(P1|0) = vec (Var(st)) = [I −Θ1 ⊗Θ1]−1 vec
(
Θ0Θ0
′) , (3.14)
where I is the n×n identity matrix, ⊗ is the Kronecker product, and the vec(·)
operator indicates that the columns of the matrix are being stacked one upon
the other.
Since the error term εt is normally distributed for all t, the prediction error
νt given by equation (3.11) is normally distributed with mean 0 and covariance
matrix Ft. Therefore, the log likelihood is given by
lnL = −nT
2
ln 2pi − 1
2
T∑
t=1
ln |Ft| − 1
2
T∑
t=1
νt
′Ft−1νt, (3.15)
where T is the number of observations.
Maximizing this function with respect to the unknown parameters will pro-
duce their maximum likelihood estimates. Several authors use this maximum
likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate the parameters in DSGE models (Al-
tug 1989, McGrantten, Rogerson and Wright 1997, Ireland 2001, 2004, Kim
2000).
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3.2.2 MCMC Bayesian Estimation
Recent years have seen a surge in the application of the Markov-chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) based Bayesian estimation instead of the MLE to DSGE models
(De Jong et al 2000a,b, Schorfheide 2000, Otrok 2001, Smets and Wouters
2003 and Lubik and Schorfheide 2004). Let θ denote the set of the unknown
parameters. The conventional Bayesian method proceeds as follows.
1. Set the prior distribution f(θ), which is the distribution the researcher
has in mind before observing the data.
2. Convert the prior distribution to the posterior distribution f(θ|data), which
is the distribution conditional on the data, using the Bayes theorem
f(θ|data) = f(data|θ)f(θ)∫
f(data|θ)f(θ)dθ
. (3.16)
3. Estimate the parameters θ using the posterior distribution.
One of the most widely used prior distributions is the normal-gamma,
which leads to the same normal-gamma posterior distribution for a simple
linear model with normal errors. Notice that the unknown parameter vectors
Θ1, Θ2 and Z in equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) are non-linear functions of the
original parameters in the DSGE model, so that the posterior distribution is
non-standard even if we use the normal-gamma prior distribution. When the
posterior distribution is non-standard, it may be difficult to obtain the denom-
inator of the right-hand-side of Bayes theorem (3.16) and to conduct the above
Step 3 analytically.
In a MCMC based Bayesian estimation, θ is sampled from the posterior
distribution and the sampled draws are used for parameter estimation. The
method used for sampling from the posterior distribution is MCMC, where
sampling is not random and depends on the draw obtained in the previous
sampling. Since the likelihood of DSGE models can be evaluated by executing
the Kalman filter, it is straightforward to evaluate the numerator of the right-
hand-side of Bayes theorem (3.16) analytically. In such a case, we may use
the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm (see Chib and Greenberg 1995), which
is one of MCMC methods.
To use the MH algorithm, we must choose a proposal density g(·|·) from
which it is possible to sample and an initial value θ0. Then, we can sample
(θ1, . . . ,θN ) from f(θ|data) by executing the following algorithm.
(1) Set n = 1.
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(2) Sample from g(θ|θn−1) and, using the sampled draw θ(proposal)n , calculate
the acceptance probability q as follows.
q = min
[
f(θ(proposal)n |data)g(θn−1|θ(proposal)n )
f(θn−1|data)g(θ(proposal)n |θn−1)
, 1
]
.
(3) Accept θ(proposal)n with probability q and reject it with probability 1− q. Set
θn = θ
(proposal)
n when accepted and θn = θn−1 when rejected.
(4) If n < N , set n = n+ 1 and return to (2). Otherwise, set n = N and end.
All previous literature that applies the MH algorithm to DSGE models uses
a method called the random-walk MH algorithm, where the proposal θ(proposal)n
is sampled from the random-walk model:
θ(proposal)n = θn−1 + νt, νt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, cH),
where c is a scalar called the adjustment coefficient, whose choice will be
explained below, and H is usually set arbitrarily or equal to −l′′−1(θˆ), where
l(θ) = ln f(θ|data) and l′′−1(θˆ) is the inverse of the second derivative of l(θ) at
θ = θˆ.
The merit of using this random-walk proposal is that g(θn−1|θ(proposal)n ) =
g(θ(proposal)n |θn−1), so that the acceptance probability q collapses to:
q = min
[
f(θ(proposal)n |data)
f(θn−1|data) , 1
]
,
which does not depend on the proposal density g(·|·). Hence, we need not find
a proposal density that mimics the posterior density. We must, however, be
careful for θ(proposal)n not to deviate from θn−1 so much because the acceptance
probability q may be low when those deviate far from each other. This may
be achieved by making c low, but θ(proposal)n may be sampled only from the
narrow range if c is too low. It is a common practice to choose c such that the
acceptance probability is around 25%. Following the previous literature, we
simply use this random-walk MH algorithm with H = −cl′′−1(θˆ).18
3.2.3 Sampling from Prior Distribution.
The form of a prior density of each parameter is given in advance by an inves-
tigator in the Bayesian inference. In general, the prior densities in the DSGE
models are set up as follows.
18We also tried a different algorithm called the independence M-H algorithm. In this algorithm,
it is important to make the acceptance probability q as close to one as possible especially around
the mode of the posterior density f(θ|data) because the same values are sampled consecutively
if q is low. To achieve this purpose, we should choose the proposal density g(·|·) that mimics the
posterior density f(θ|data) especially around its mode, which may be possible by approximating
the log of the true density l(θ)(= f(θ|data)) using the second order Taylor expansion around its
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It is assumed that the exogenous shocks εt such as technology shock, pref-
erence shock and monetary shock are persistent for their past shocks and
these motions follow an AR (1) process such that ut = ρut−1 + εt where error
term εt is i.i.d. Since the coefficient ρ must be between zero and one in the
AR(1) process with the stationary property, their prior densities obey beta dis-
tributions. The variances of the error term εt are set up to be based on inverted
gamma distributions. For the other parameters of the DSGE models normal
distributions are adopted as their prior densities.
The distinction of the prior in the DSGE models is not to use normal-gamma
distributions directly like other Bayesian estimations but to build up their
own prior distributions by sampling the draws of the prior distributions given
above. The aim that the priors are built up by sampling is to exclude the
drawn parameters which are on unstable path in the DSGE model or are not
the equilibrium solution from the sampling of the priors, and to include only
the draws which are on stable path in the DSGE model or are the equilibrium
solution into the sampling of the priors
The procedure to build up the priors is as follows. Firstly, draw around
2-3000 candidates of the parameters randomly from the given prior distribu-
tions, and save them. Next, using the candidates, solve the DSGE model for
each candidate and obtain the recursive equilibrium law of motion (or stable
path to the equilibrium) as equation (3.5). If one candidate derives the indeter-
minacy or no-existence of the equilibrium solution which indicates the DSGE
cannot be solved, then this candidate is removed from the sample of the prior
distribution. If the DSGE model can be solved using one candidate, then this
candidate is saved in the sample of the prior distribution. Finally, depict a
histogram from the saved sample, where all draws of the parameters form the
recursive equilibrium law of motion, as the prior density.
mode as follows (Watanabe 2001).
l(θ) ≈ l(θˆ) + (θ − θˆ)′l′(θˆ) + 1
2
(θ − θˆ)′l′′(θˆ)(θ − θˆ),
= constant +
1
2
[θ − θˆ + l′′−1(θˆ)l′(θˆ)]′l′′(θˆ)[θ − θˆ + l′′−1(θˆ)l′(θˆ)],
= ln cg(θ),
where g(θ) is the normal density with mean θˆ− l′′−1(θˆ)l′(θˆ) and covariance −l′′−1(θˆ), which may
be used for a proposal density. This proposal density does not depend on θn−1.
This algorithm is much more efficient than the random-walk MH algorithm if the number
of parameters is small (Kasuya, Nakajima and Watanabe 2005). However, the number of pa-
rameters estimated in this paper is 27 and they are transformed nonlinearly for state space
representation. As a result, we find that the acceptance probability is very low such as 1–2%
and cannot be improved by using the accept-reject (AR) MH algorithm proposed by Tierney
(1994).
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3.3 Impulse Response Functions
Here, how to derive the impulse response function by the Bayesian approach is
described. The feature of the function by the Bayesian approach is that each
value of the impulse response function is calculated using each draw of the
parameter set, and that the sample of these values are saved as the posterior
densities of the impulse response function, and used for calculating the mo-
ments (e.g. mean or median) and credible interval of the posterior densities.19
Let M denote the sampling size of the MCMC simulation. The impulse
response function by the Bayesian approach might be assembled using M
draws of parameters set sampled from the posterior densities in Section 3.2.2.
and the procedure is presented as below.
First of all, the matrix Θ1, and Θ0 in equation (3.6a) are derived for every
draw of parameters set sampled. Using Θ1 and Θ0, calculate the impulse
response function IR(k)i from the first horizon via k horizon up to T horizon
for i-th draws as below.
IR(k)i = A×Θk−11,i ×Θ0,i × ε, for ε =

0
...
εj
...
0

,
where A denotes the matrix in equation (3.6b), and Θ1,i and Θ0,i are derived
from the i-th draws of parameters set, and k is the number of horizon. εj is
the j-th exogenous shock whose size is one standard deviation estimated in
Section 3.2. Then, this calculation is implemented for all of M draws and all
of M impulse responses are saved as the posterior densities. And calculate
moments such as mean and confidence intervals (e.g., 90% interval) from the
M samples. Finally, plot the moments and the confidence intervals of the
impulse response functions for each observed variables yt in equation (3.6b).
3.4 Variance Decomposition
As well as the impulse response functions, forecast error variance decompo-
sition is derived using the parameters of equations (3.6a and b). The mean
squared error (MSE) of h-period-ahead forecast of endogenous variables yt can
19The method explained here is based on Schorfheide (2000) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004).
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be written as
MSE[yt(h)] =
N∑
j=1
h∑
k=1
[A ×Θk−11 ×Θ0×εj×ε′j×Θ′0×Θk−1
′
1 ×A′ ], for εj =

0
...
εj
...
0

,
where εj is the standard diviation of jth structural shock, N is the number of
shocks εj, and k is the number of horizon. This equation indicates that the
MSE consists of the sum of h-period-ahead forecast error variances accounted
for by the sum of N shocks. Notice that MSE[yt(h)] is expressed by the matrix
in which ith diagonal element is the MSE of variable yi. With this expression,
we can calculate the contribution of jth structural shock to the MSE of the
h-period-ahead forecast of variables yt as below.
V ar[yt,j(h)] =
h∑
k=1
[A ×Θk−11 ×Θ0×εj×ε′j×Θ′0×Θk−1
′
1 ×A′ ], for εj =

0
...
εj
...
0

.
Denoting the ith diagonal element of the matrix MSE[yt,j(h)] and V ar[yt(h)]
by MSE[yi(h)] and V ar[yi,j(h)], respectively, we obtain the proportion of the h-
period-ahead error variance of variable yi accounted for by structural shock
εj,
ωi,j(h) = V ar[yi,j(h)]/MSE[yi(h)].
This value ωi,j(h) indicates the forecast error variance decomposed into com-
ponents accounted for by jth shock in the variable yi at h horizon. In this way,
we get a sample of variance decomposition using each sample of parameters,
and save it as the posterior distribution.
4 Data
In estimating the model, following Smets and Wouters (2003), we chose seven
quarterly macroeconomic series: output, consumption, investment, labor in-
put, real wage, inflation, nominal rate as data. The sample period is from
1970:Q1 to 1998:Q4. The raw data is picked up from FERIS that is the
database system of the Bank of Japan.
The seven series are as follows. Output series is real GDP per labor force,
seasonally adjusted (unit is 1 million yen at 1990). Consumption series is
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real consumption per labor force, s.a., (unit same as above). Investment se-
ries is real investment per labor force, s.a., (unit same as above). Labor input
series are derived from Work hour index times total employment divided by
labor population. Real wage series is real wage index calculated from nominal
wage index divided by GDP deflator. Inflation series is GDP deflator infla-
tion rate (quarterly, annual rate, decadal demeaned). Nominal rate series is
the uncollateralized call rate (annual rate, decadal demeaned). The four real
series, output, consumption, investment, and labor, and real wage, are trans-
formed to their logarithms and then detrended using the Hodrick and Prescott
(HP) filter. Nominal rate and inflation are detrended using HP filter without
log-transformation. After those procedures, all above data for estimating the
model are obtained by being demeaned.
There is an issue of how to filter inflation rate. For the Japanese case, we
simply assumed that 70’s inflation target, 80’s inflation target and 90’s infla-
tion target were different. Thus, by constructing decadal dummies for 70’s and
80’s, we demeaned the inflation rate accordingly. Also, we have demeaned the
call rate using same decadal dummy coefficients. We know this is a controver-
sial treatment, but we didn’t know any better way to deal with it.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Preliminary Setting
In order to estimate the parameters of the DSGE model described in Section
2, the data is limited over the period 1970:Q2 - 1998:Q4, because of exclud-
ing the period of zero interest rate bound from 1999:Q1, in which the law of
equilibrium motions of macro-economies is plausible to be apart away from
the ordinary economic dynamics. The seven key observed variables used as
the data are real GDP, inflation, real wage, real investment, real consumption,
nominal interest rate and labor input as can be seen from Figure 1, whereas
the capital stock and the rental rate on capital are dealt with as unobserved
variables based on the manner of Smets and Wouters (2003).
[ Insert Figure 1. ]
The fact that the model contains nine structural shocks and there are only
seven observable variables raises a general identification issue. That is, for
instance, it is difficult to separately identify the labor supply shock and the
wage markup shock in equation (2.28). Identification is conducted by assum-
ing that the each of the structural shocks is uncorrelated and that the three
“cost-push” shocks (equity premium shock, price markup shock and wage
markup shock) and monetary policy shock follow a white noise process. The
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remain five shocks (preference shock, productivity shock, investment shock,
labor supply shock and government spending shock) are assumed to follow an
AR(1) process where the autoregressive parameter has a relatively tight prior
distribution with a mean of 0.85 and a standard error of 0.10, clearly distin-
guishing them from the white noise shocks.
In our DSGE model following the earlier studies such as Smets and Wouters
(2003) who studied the euro area, Onatski and Williams (2004) and Levin,
Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005) who studies the U.S. area, some pa-
rameters need to be calibrated. We chose most of the calibrated parameters
following Hayashi and Prescott (2002). We set the discount factor, β, equal to
0.98, and the depreciation rate, τ , equal to 0.08, and the share of capital, α,
equal to 0.35. The ratio of steady-state government spending to total output,
gy, is assumed to be 0.15, while the steady-state capital output ratio, ky, is
assumed to be 2.2. In addition, we also need to fix the parameter capturing
the markup in wage setting, λw, as this parameter is not identified. We set λw
equal to 0.20. The steady-state rental rate on capital (or the value of capital)
is derived such as r¯k = 1β − (1 − τ). Finally, our study sets zero-percent rate
as inflation target rate, pi∗, and assumes the monetary policy response on the
current change in inflation and the output gap, µ∆pi and µδy, are zero as can
be seen from equation (2.39).
The prior distributions of the other 27 estimated parameters following the
manner of Smets and Wouters (2003) are given in Table 1. All the variances of
the shocks are assumed to be distributed as an inverted Gamma distribution
with a degree of freedom equal two. This distribution guarantees a positive
standard deviation with a rather large domain. The distribution of the au-
toregressive parameters in the six persistent shocks is assumed to follow a
beta distribution with mean 0.85 and standard error 0.1. The beta distribution
covers the range between zero and one, but a rather tight standard error was
used in order to have a clear separation between the persistent shocks and
temporary shocks. The technology, utility, and price-setting parameters were
assumed to be either Normal distributed or Beta distributed (for the parame-
ters were restricted to the 0− 1 range).
[ Insert Table 1. ]
The mean of the prior was typically set at values that correspond to those
in Smets and Wouters (2003)’s work. The standard deviations were set so that
the domain covers a reasonable range of parameter values. For example, we
set the mean of the Calvo parameters in price and wage setting equations, ξp,
ξw so that average length of the contract is about one year following Smets
and Wouters (2003) and in the estimates of Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido
(2001) for the European economy, and the standard deviation equal to 0.15,
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which is larger than 0.5 assumed by Smets and Wouters (2003). Similarly, the
mean of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc is set equal to one. The
elasticity of the capital utilization cost function has a mean of 0.2, and include
in its domain the value of 0.1 suggested by King and Rebelo (2000) for the
U.S. economy. The share of fixed cost (or the elasticity of the cost of adjusting
investment) in total production, φ, has a mean of 1.45 which is close to those
CEE (2005) for the United States. A wide range of calibrations has been used
for the inverse elasticity of labor supply. We took as a starting point a value
of two, which falls in between the relatively low elasticities that are typically
estimated in the microlabor literature and the higher elasticities typically used
in DSGE models. Finally, the priors on the means of the coefficients in the
monetary policy reaction, i.e. 1.7, helps to guarantee a unique solution path
when solving the model; the prior on the lagged interest rate is set at 0.8,
and the prior on the output gap reaction coefficient corresponds to the Taylor
coefficient of 0.5.
5.2 Parameters Estimates
For parameter estimation, we conduct the MCMC simulation with 350,000 it-
erations. The first 250,000 draws are discarded and then the next 100,000
are recorded. Using these 100,000 draws for each of the parameters, we cal-
culate the posterior means, the standard errors of the posterior means, the
standard deviations, the 90% intervals and the convergence diagnostic (CD)
statistics proposed by Geweke (1992). The posterior means are computed by
averaging the simulated draws. The standard errors of the posterior means are
computed using a Parzen window with a bandwidth of 10,000 (see Shephard
and Pitt 1997, p.665). The standard deviations are computed as the sample
standard deviation of the simulated draws. The 90% intervals are calculated
using the 5th and 95th percentiles of the simulated draws. Geweke (1992)
suggests assessing the convergence of the MCMC by comparing values early
in the sequence with those late in the sequence. Let X(i) be the ith draw of
a parameter in the recorded 100,000 draws, and let X¯A = 1nA
∑nA
i=1X
(i) and
X¯B =
1
nB
∑100,000
i=100,001−nB X
(i). Using these values, Geweke (1992) proposes the
following statistics called convergence diagnostics (CD).
CD =
X¯A − X¯B√
σˆ2A/nA + σˆ
2
B/nB
, (1)
where
√
σˆ2A/nA and
√
σˆ2B/nB are standard errors of X¯A and X¯B. If the sequence
of X(i) is stationary, it converges in distribution to the standard normal. We
set nA = 10, 000 and nB = 50, 000 and compute σˆ2A and σˆ
2
B using Parzen windows
with bandwidth of 1,000 and 5,000 respectively.
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Table 2 reports our estimation results for the Japanese economy prior to
the period of zero interest rate bound together with the posterior means of
the parameters for the euro area by Smets and Wouters (SW, 2003) and the
United States by Onatski and Williams (OW, 2004) and Levin et al. (LOWW,
2005). According to the CD values, the null hypothesis that the sequence of
100,000 draws is stationary is accepted at the 1% significance level for all pa-
rameters. Figures 2A through 2C depict the prior and posterior distribution of
each parameter. The latter is obtained from the recorded 100,000 draws. The
persistence in shocks is estimated as an autoregressive parameter ρ, whose
posterior mean lies between 0.37 (for preference shock) and 0.87 (for investment
shock).
[ Insert Table 2 and Figure 2. ]
Here we focus on the four parameters that represent the degree of price
and wage stickiness. For instance, the posterior mean of price indexation pa-
rameter γp is 0.61, indicating that the weight on lagged inflation in the inflation
equation (2.36), γp1+βγp , is only 0.38. There is, however, a considerable degree of
Calvo wage and price stickiness because the posterior means of ξw and ξp are
0.37 and 0.65 respectively and 1 − ξw and 1 − ξp indicate the probabilities that
a given price and wage can be optimized in a quarterly period. The average
duration of wage contracts is estimated to be about 1.6 quarter, whereas that
of price contract is about 2.9 quarters. Both of the durations are quite short
compared with the earlier studies such as SW, OW and LOWW, and the greater
stickiness in prices relative to wages is somewhat counterintuitive.
The posterior mean and the 90% interval of the inverse intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution σc are greater than one, which is consistent with most of
the RBC literature that assumes an elasticity of substitution between 0.5 and
1 and with the results of SW, OW and LOWW. On the other hand, the posterior
mean of the external habit formation θ is 0.64, which is much higher relative
to the U.S. and the euro area. The posterior mean of the weight of the present
consumption on the past consumption, θ/(1 + θ), is about 0.39, while that on
the future consumption, 1/(1 + θ), is about 0.61.
The posterior mean of the adjustment cost parameter 1/ϕ is about 8.34,
which is quite low compared with the U.S. and the euro area. It implies that
investment increases only by 0.06 percent in the short-run and 0.12 percent in
the long run following a one percent increase in the current value of capital
stock, qt. The posterior means of the fixed cost share φ and the capital utiliza-
tion cost ψ are 1.58 and 0.18 respectively. The posterior mean of inverse labor
supply elasticity with respect to real wage, σL, is about 2.43, indicating that
labor supply increases by 0.41 percent following a one percent increase in real
wage.
33
Finally, we obtain plausible estimates for the long-run reaction function of
the monetary authorities. The estimates state that the response of interest
rate to inflation, µpi, is much greater than one, indicating that the Japanese
monetary authorities reacted very actively toward inflation.20 On the contrary,
the response to output, µy, is small. The posterior mean of the response to
lagged interest rate, ρm, is 0.68, indicating relatively low persistence compared
with the U.S. and the euro area.
We also extend the sample period to 1970:Q1 – 2004:Q4 such that the
period of zero-percent interest rate bound is included. However, the parameter
estimates are similar to those excluding the period of zero interest rate bound.
Accordingly, we omit to explain these results here.
5.3 Impulse Response Analysis
The impulse responses to each of the nine structural shocks are estimated
using a selection of 10,000 parameters from the posterior sample of 100,000
which were described in the last subsection. Figures 3A through 3I plot the
median response together with the 5th and the 95 percentiles. The estimated
impulse responses to all shocks except investment shock and equity premium
shock, are consistent with those in SW (2003) for the euro economy.
(1) Positive Productivity Shock (Figure 3A)
A positive productivity shock leads to a hump-shaped rise in output, con-
sumption and investment and a hump-shaped fall in inflation, nominal inter-
est rate, rental rate of capital and labor input. No significant effect on real
wage is observed because the 90% interval includes 0. All these results are
consistent with those in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3A. ]
(2) Negative Labor Supply Shock (Figure 3B)
A negative labor shock leads to a hump-shaped rise in inflation, nominal
interest rate, real wage, rental rate of capital and a hump-shaped fall in output,
consumption, investment and labor input. These responses would be similar
to those of “negative” productivity shock except for real wage and labor input.
All these results are consistent with those in SW (2003) except for rental rate,
which falls in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3B. ]
20If µpi < 1, it leads to the indeterminacy of solution to the LRE model. We preclude such an
indeterminacy case by assuming beta distribution for the prior of µpi. See Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004) for the analysis that does not preclude the indeterminacy case.
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(3) Positive Wage Markup Shock (Figure 3C)
A positive wage markup shock leads to a hump-shaped rise in inflation,
nominal interest rate, real wage and rental rate and a hump-shaped fall in
output, consumption, investment and labor input. All these results are con-
sistent with those in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3C. ]
(4) Positive Price Markup Shock (Figure 3D)
The effects of a positive price markup shock on output, consumption, in-
flation, nominal interest rate, investment and labor input are similar to those
of the above positive wage markup shock. The effects on real wage and the
rental rate are opposite to those of the wage markup shock. These results are
consistent with those in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3D. ]
(5) Positive Preference Shock (Figure 3E)
A positive preference shock leads to a hump-shaped rise in all variables
except investment (and capital stock). These results are consistent with those
in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3E. ]
(6) Positive Investment Shock (Figure 3F)
The effects of a positive investment shock are different from those in SW
(2003) except for real wage, rental rate and investment. Output and con-
sumption rise monotonically over time in our estimation while they rise in a
hump-shaped manner in SW (2003). The effects on inflation and labor input
are not significant in our estimation while they rise in a hump-shaped manner
in SW (2003).
The reason to our counterintuitive results might be our tiny estimate of
ϕ. As can be seen from equation (2.26), a tiny value of ϕ makes investment
almost independent of the current value of the capital stock, qt, and hence
the convergence of investment shock very slow. Investment equation (2.26),
which is based on a financial market with complete information, might be
misspecified. It is worthwhile to extend to a more advanced model, for example,
based on incomplete information.
[ Insert Figure 3F. ]
(7) Positive Equity Premium Shock (Figure 3G)
The effects of a positive equity premium shock on output and nominal inter-
est rate are also counterintuitive and not consistent with those in SW (2003).
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Output decreases gradually in SW (2003), but it is not true for our estimation.
The effect on nominal interest rate is not significant while it rises in SW (2003).
The reason might to be the same as that for the above investment shock.
[ Insert Figure 3G. ]
(8) Positive Government Spending Shock (Figure 3H)
A positive government spending shock leads to a hump-shaped rise in out-
put, inflation, nominal interest rate, rental rate and labor input and a hump-
shaped fall in consumption and investment. The effect on real wage is not
significant. These results are consistent with those in SW (2003).
[ Insert Figure 3H. ]
(9) Positive Monetary Policy Shock (Figure 3I)
A rise in nominal interest rate leads to a hump-shaped fall in all variables
except nominal interest rate, which is also consistent with the result in SW
(2003).
[ Insert Figure 3I. ]
5.4 Variance decomposition
The forecast error variance decompositions of the seven observable variables
to each of the nine structural shocks are calculated using a selection of 5,000
parameters from the posterior sample 100,000. Table 3 reports the mean of
the variance decompositions at four horizons from contemporary horizon ( t = 0
) to long run ( t = 100, 25 years ) via short run (t = 4, 1 year) and medium run
(t = 10, 2.5 years).
[ Insert Table 3 ]
Smets and Wouters (2003) shows that labor supply shock accounts for a
large friction of the variance of almost macroeconimic variables in the long run
in euro area. Meanwhile, Table 3 shows that productivity shock and invest-
ment shock accounts for a substantial portion of the fluctuation of the seven
macroeconomic variables in the long run in the Japanese economy.
The variance of output is driven mainly by preference shock, government
spending shock and monetary policy shock in the contemporary horizon. The
preference shock accounts for around 53 %, the government spending shock
for 27%, and the monetary policy shock for 11%. However, these effects
weaken as horizon is longer. Instead, the effects of the productivity shock
and the price markup shock enlarge in the medium run: the ratio of the pro-
ductivity shock is 41 %, and that of the price markup shock is 9 %. In the
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long run (25 years), the investment shock and the productivity shock play the
main role in the output variation: the former account for about 60 %, the latter
for 26 %. In contrast to Smets and Wouters (2003), labor supply shock and
monetary policy shock do not influence the fluctuation of output in the long
run.
The preference shock accounts for 78 % in the variance of consumption in
the contemporary horizon. But the effect of the preference shock is short-lived.
And the other factor contributing to the variance is the monetary policy shock
which accounts for around 14 %. The contribution of the productivity shock
plays the important role from the short run to the long run. This effect in
the long run is 25 % of the variance in consumption, whereas the investment
shock becomes the primary factor which account for 60 % in the long run.
Similar to Smets and Wouters (2003), the price markup shock plays the
main role in the variance of inflation at all horizon from the short run to the
long run. It accounts for 87 % in the contemporary horizon, for 62 % in
the medium run, and for 48 % in the long run. And the productivity shock
influences inflation. The effect in the short run is about 9% and it grows up to
20 % in the medium and long runs. The investment shock is not a negligible
factor in the long run. In contrast to Smets and Wouters (2003), monetary
policy shock does not occupy a large fraction of the fluactuation of inflation.
And also Table 3 shows that the variance of nominal wage is very similar to
that of inflation.
The variance of the nominal rate is dominated by the monetary policy shock
in the very short run. As the horizon is long, the contribution of the shock
gradually reduces such as 57 % in the short run, 50 % in the medium run, and
40% in the long run. After the short run, price markup shock and investment
shock influence the nominal interest rate at a certain level.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the CEE (2005) model, which is the most successful
among New-Keynesian DSGE models in explaining the behavior of macroe-
conomic variables in the U.S. and euro area, for the Japanese economy over
1970:Q1 through 1998:Q4, which is prior to the period of zero interest rate
bound. Using Bayesian inference via MCMC simulation, we find that the pa-
rameters and impulse response functions in the Japanese economy are esti-
mated to be quite consistent with the earlier studies such as SW (2003) for the
euro area and OW (2004) and LOWW (2005) for the U.S. area. For example,
we find evidence that the Japanese monetary authorities reacted very actively
toward inflation. The only exception is investment, whose adjustment cost
is estimated huge and whose shock is estimated to give long-lasting effects
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on output and consumption compared with those in the previous studies for
the U.S. and euro area. On the other hand, variance decomposition shows
that monetary policy shock do not influence the fluctuations of output and
inflation in the long run, in contrast to Smets and Wouters (2003). Instead,
productivity shock and investment shock account for a substantial portion of
all macroeconomic variables including output and inflation in the long run.
This paper is a starting point of the Bayesian analysis of DSGE models for
the Japanese economy, and there remain some issues that should be pursued.
First, we should calculate the marginal likelihood to compare with other DSGE
models and reference models such as VAR and VAR-DSGE models (Smets
and Wouters 2003, Del Negro and Schorfheide 2004, Del Negro, Schorfheide,
Smets and Wouters 2004 and An and Schorfheide 2005). These issues are
now under study. Second, since we find that the CEE (2005) model leads to
counterintuitive results on investment, it is important to develop an alternative
model taking Japanese companies’ investment behavior into account.
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Appendix
A Simplified Smets and Wouters (2003) Model Skelton
A.1 Model Description (Log-linearized version)
A.1.1 Consumer/Investor’s Equilibrium Conditions
1. Consumption Euler equation:
cˆt =
θ
1 + θ
cˆt−1+
1
1 + θ
Etcˆt+1− 1− θ
(1 + θ)σc
(Rˆt−Etpˆit+1)+ 1− θ
(1 + θ)σc
(1−ρc)uct (2.29)
where we set Etuct+1 = ρ
cuct .
2. Investment Euler equation:
învt =
1
1 + β
învt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etînvt+1 +
ϕ
1 + β
qˆt +
β
1 + β
(1− ρinv)uinvt (2.30)
where we set Etuinvt+1 = ρ
invuinvt .
3. Asset pricing Euler equation:
qˆt = −(Rˆt − Etpˆit+1) + 1− τ
1− τ + r¯kEtqˆt+1 +
r¯k
1− τ + r¯kEtrˆ
k
t+1 + ε
q
t (2.31)
4. Wage setting equation.:
wˆt =
β
1 + β
Etwˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etpˆit+1 − 1 + βγw
1 + β
pˆit +
γw
1 + β
pˆit−1
− 1
1 + β
Ψw
[
wˆt − σLLˆt − σc
1− θ (cˆt − θcˆt−1)− u
L
t − εwt
] (2.32)
where Ψw =
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)(
1+
(1+λw)σL
λw
)
ξw
A.1.2 Firm’s Equilibrium Conditions
1. Production function:
yˆt = φu
a
t + φαkˆt−1 + φαψrˆ
k
t + φ(1− α)Lˆt (2.35)
2. Labor demand:
Lˆt = −wˆt + (1 + ψ)rˆkt + kˆt−1 (2.34)
3. Price setting equation.:
pˆit =
β
1 + βγp
Etpˆit+1 +
γp
1 + βγp
pˆit−1 +
1
1 + βγp
Ψp
[
αrˆkt + (1− α)wˆt − uat + εpt
]
(2.36)
where Ψp =
(1−βξp)(1−ξp)
ξp
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A.1.3 Miscellaneous Equilibrium Conditions
1. Resource constraint:
yˆt = (1− τky−gy)cˆt + τky învt + r¯kψkyrkt + gyugt (2.38)
2. Capital accumulation equation:
kˆt = (1− τ)kˆt−1 + τ învt−1 (2.33)
3. Monetary policy rule:
Rˆt = ρmRˆt−1 + (1− ρm) [µpipˆit−1 + µyyˆt] + εmt (2.39)
Persistent Shocks
1. : preference shock: uct = ρ
cuct−1 + εct
2. : investment shock: uinvt = ρ
invuinvt−1 + εinvt
3. : labor shock: uLt = ρ
LuLt−1 + εLt
4. : productivity shock: uat = ρ
zuat−1 + εat
5. : government spending shock: ugt = ρ
gugt−1 + ε
g
t
Forecast Errors
1. Inflation forecast error: pˆit = Et−1pˆit + ηpit
2. Wage forecast error: wˆt = Et−1wˆt + ηwt
3. Q forecast error: qˆt = Et−1qˆt + η
q
t
4. Investment forecast error: învt = Et−1învt + ηinvt
5. Consumption forecast error: cˆt = Et−1cˆt + ηct
6. Capital cost forecast error: rˆkt = Et−1rˆkt + ηrkt
A.1.4 Endogenous Variables
yt : output
pit : inflation rate
wt : nominal wage
kt : capital stock
qt : shadow price of capital stock
invt : physical investment
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ct : consumption
Rt : nominal interest rate
rkt : rental rate on capital (cost of capital)
Lt : labor input
uct , u
inv
t , u
L
t , u
a
t , u
g
t : persistent shocks to consumption, investment, labor, pro-
ductivity, and government spending, respectively.
A.1.5 Exogenous Shock Variables, (i.i.d. Normal distribution)
εct : preference shock
εinvt : investment shock
εqt : equity premium shock
εLt : labor shock
εwt : wage mark-up shock
εat : productivity shock
εpt : price mark-up shock
εgt : government spending shock
εmt : monetary policy shock
A.1.6 Forecast Errors
ηpit : forecast error of inflation
ηwt : forecast error of real wage
ηqt : forecast error of equity premium
ηinvt : forecast error of investment
ηct : forecast error of consumption
ηrkt : forecast error of rental rate
A.2 Preliminary Settings
A.2.1 Estimated Parameters
θ: habit formation, σc: inverse long-run IES, σL: inverse labor supply
elasticity, ϕ: inverse adj.cost, φ: fixed cost share, ψ: capital utilization
cost, γp: price indexation, γw: wage indexation, ξp: Calvo price no-revise
prob., ξw: Calvo wage no-revise prob., ρm: lagged interest rate, µpi:
reaction on inflation, µy: reaction on output, ρc: persitence, preference
, ρinv: persistence, investment, ρL: persistence, labor supply, ρa:
persistence, productivity, ρg: persistence, government spending, εc: S.D.,
preference shock, εinv: S.D., investment shock, εq: S.D., equity premium
shock, εL: S.D, labor supply shock, εw: S.D., wage markup shock, εz:
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S.D., productivity shock, εp: S.D., price markup shock, εg: S.D., gov.
spending shock, εm: S.D., monetary policy shock.
A.2.2 Values of Calibrated Parameters
discount factor: β = 0.99,
depriciation rate of capital: τ = 0.025,
share of capital: α = 0.3,
capital-output ratio: ky = 2.2,
government spending-output ratio: gy = 0.2,
wage markup: λw = 0.05,
steady-state rental rate: r¯k = 1β − 1 + τ , (Smets and Wouters 2003, p1135)
A.3 Canonical LRE Form
Γ0

yt
pit
wt
kt
qt
invt
ct
Rt
rkt
Lt
Etpit+1
Etwt+1
Etqt+1
Etinvt+1
Etct+1
Etr
k
t+1
uct
uinvt
uLt
uat
ugt

= Γ1

yt−1
pit−1
wt−1
kt−1
qt−1
invt−1
ct−1
Rt−1
rkt−1
Lt−1
Et−1pit
Et−1wt
Et−1qt
Et−1invt
Et−1ct
Et−1rkt
uct−1
uinvt−1
uLt−1
uat−1
ugt−1

+ Ψ

εct
εinvt
εqt
εLt
εwt
εat
εpt
εgt
εmt

+ Π

ηpit
ηwt
ηqt
ηinvt
ηct
ηrkt

where coefficient matrices Γ0,Γ1,Ψ, and Π are set as follows.
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Table 1. Prior Distributions of the Parameters
parameters meanings type mean S. D.
Structural
Parameters
  habit formation beta 0.7 0.1

 
inverse long-run IES normal 1 0.375


inverse labor supply elasticity normal 2 0.75
  inverse adj. cost normal 4 1.5
 fixed cost share normal 1.45 0.25
 capital utilization cost normal 0.2 0.075


price indexation beta 0.75 0.15


wage indexation beta 0.75 0.15


Calvo price no-revise prob. beta 0.75 0.15


Calvo wage no-revise prob. beta 0.75 0.15


Calvo employment beta 0.50 0.15
Policy Parameters
	

policy, lag interest beta 0.8 0.1



policy, inflation normal 1.7 0.1



policy, output normal 0.125 0.05


 
policy, delta inflation normal 0.3 0.1


 
policy, delta output normal 0.0625 0.05
Shock Persistence
	
	
	
persist, target beta 0.85 0.1
	


persist, productivity beta 0.85 0.1
	
 
persist, preference beta 0.85 0.1
	

persist, gov. expenditure beta 0.85 0.1
	

persist, labor supply beta 0.85 0.1
	

persist, investment beta 0.85 0.1
S. D.
of Shocks

 
preference shock inv. gamma 0.2 2


investment shock inv. gamma 0.1 2


equity premium shock inv. gamma 0.4 2



productivity shock inv. gamma 0.4 2


price markup shock inv. gamma 0.15 2


labor supply shock inv. gamma 1.0 2


wage markup shock inv. gamma 0.25 2


gov. expenditure shock inv. gamma 0.3 2


monetary policy shock inv. gamma 0.1 2

	
	
inflation target shock inv. gamma 0.02 2
Table 2. Posterior Distributions of the Parameters
(Before the Period of Zero Interest Rate Bound: 1970:Q1 — 1998:Q4 )
SW OW LOWW This Paper
(2003) (2004) (2005)
Parameters mean median median mean S. E. S. D. 90-percent interval CD
Structural
Parameters
  0.592 0.4 0.293 0.641 0.016 0.102 [ 0.451 0.780 ] 0.345

 
1.391 2.178 2.167 2.041 0.028 0.296 [ 1.565 2.530 ] -0.202


2.503 3.0 1.359 2.427 0.081 0.718 [ 1.241 3.589] -0.032
  6.962 0.152  0.541  8.338 0.036 0.914 [ 6.870 9.890 ] 0.185
 1.417 1.8 1.084 1.581 0.019 0.239 [ 1.186 1.969 ] 0.417
 0.201 2.8 0.212 0.182 0.005 0.076 [ 0.056 0.308 ] -0.490


0.477 0.323 0.078 0.613 0.006 0.109 [ 0.439 0.804] 1.412


0.728 0.0 0.82 0.578 0.005 0.135 [ 0.353 0.803 ] -2.566


0.905 0.930 0.834 0.650 0.005 0.042 [ 0.579 0.726 ] -0.985


0.742 0.704 0.764 0.367 0.012 0.077 [ 0.236 0.500 ] 0.023


0.597 0.400 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. [ N.A N.A ] N.A.
Policy Parameters
	

0.956 0.962 0.83 0.682 0.003 0.034 [ 0.625 0.736 ] 0.145



1.688 4.0 2.749 1.589 0.005 0.095 [1.436 1.747] 0.262



0.098 0.099 0.055 0.053 0.003 0.042 [ -0.013 0.126] 1.208


 
0.151 0.14 0.295 N.A. N.A. N.A. [ N.A. N.A. ] N.A.


 
0.158 0.159 0.505 N.A. N.A. N.A. [ N.A. N.A. ] N.A.
Shock Persistence
	
	
	
0.855 0.582 0.995 N.A. N.A. N.A. [ N.A. N.A. ] N.A.
	


0.811 0.957 0.962 0.851 0.006 0.077 [ 0.691 0.937] 2.116
	
 
0.838 0.876 0.946 0.368 0.020 0.145 [ 0.170 0.642 ] -0.668
	

0.943 0.972 0.945 0.792 0.004 0.075 [ 0.664 0.911] 1.421
	

0.881 0.974 0.983 0.462 0.007 0.106 [ 0.284 0.636 ] 0.582
	

0.913 0.943 0.734 0.871 0.004 0.048 [ 0.782 0.935] 1.481
S. D.
of Shocks

 
0.407 0.24 0.125 0.077 0.002 0.015 [ 0.056 0.106 ] -0.087


0.113 0.059 1.045 0.046 0.001 0.014 [ 0.029 0.074 ] 0.573


0.613 7.0 4.047 0.114 0.001 0.017 [ 0.088 0.144 ] 0.888



0.639 0.343 0.595 0.110 0.002 0.025 [ 0.078 0.157 ] 0.444


0.165 0.172 0.205 0.245 0.018 0.104 [ 0.092 0.428 ] 0.477


3.818 2.351 2.352 0.074 0.000 0.005 [ 0.066 0.082 ] 0.941


0.297 0.246 0.294 0.079 0.003 0.022 [ 0.052 0.127 ] -0.829


0.335 0.354 0.287 0.043 0.000 0.003 [0.038 0.048 ] 1.007


0.089 0.0 0.0002 0.011 0.000 0.001 [ 0.010 0.012] 0.709

	
	
0.033 1.0 0.117 N.A. N.A. N.A. [ N.A. N.A ] N.A
Note:
(a) SW denotes Smets and Wouters’ (2003) model. OW denotes Onatski and Willams’ (2004)
model. LOWW denotes Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams’ (2005) model.
(b)   indicates that it is the mean of  instead of  .
(c) The first 250,000 draws of MH algorithm are discarded to guarantee convergence and then
the next 100,000 draws are used for calculating the posterior means, the standard errors
of the posterior means (S.E.), the standard deviations (S.D.), the 90% intervals and the
convergence diagnostic (CD) statistics proposed by Geweke (1992).
(d) The posterior mean is computed by averaging the simulated draws.
(e) S.E. is computed using a Parzen window with a bandwidth of 10,000.
(f) S.D. is computed as the sample standard deviation of the simulated draws.
(g) The 90% intervals refer to 90 % posterior probability bands. These bands are calculated
using the 5th and 95th percentiles of the simulated draws.
(h) CD is computed using equation (5.1), where we set 

    and 

   and
compute 

and 

using a Parzen window with bandwidths of 1,000 and 5,000 respec-
tively.
Table 3. Variance Decomposition
(Before the Period of Zero Interest Rate Bound: 1970:Q1 — 1998:Q4 )
C I Y L  W R
t = 0 Productivity shock 0.041 0.110 0.038 0.286 0.086 0.097 0.000
Labor supply shock 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.043 0.000
Wage markup shock 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.079 0.000
Price markup shock 0.042 0.050 0.040 0.002 0.872 0.759 0.000
Preference shock 0.772 0.024 0.527 0.394 0.018 0.015 0.001
Investment shock 0.001 0.459 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.000
Equity premium shock 0.000 0.295 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Government spending shock 0.005 0.007 0.273 0.208 0.004 0.001 0.000
Monetary policy shock 0.138 0.051 0.111 0.085 0.011 0.006 0.999
t = 4 Productivity shock 0.259 0.206 0.275 0.175 0.209 0.422 0.112
Labor supply shock 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.043 0.004
Wage markup shock 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.036 0.002
Price markup shock 0.133 0.035 0.125 0.121 0.640 0.462 0.241
Preference shock 0.432 0.040 0.305 0.365 0.046 0.011 0.040
Investment shock 0.002 0.622 0.029 0.023 0.039 0.012 0.020
Equity premium shock 0.000 0.056 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
Government spending shock 0.023 0.012 0.125 0.155 0.008 0.004 0.008
Monetary policy shock 0.138 0.021 0.123 0.142 0.046 0.009 0.572
t = 10 Productivity shock 0.398 0.216 0.412 0.185 0.210 0.558 0.150
Labor supply shock 0.013 0.006 0.013 0.021 0.008 0.025 0.006
Wage markup shock 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.019 0.003
Price markup shock 0.106 0.014 0.094 0.120 0.624 0.274 0.218
Preference shock 0.321 0.034 0.212 0.343 0.044 0.012 0.050
Investment shock 0.014 0.682 0.086 0.034 0.056 0.093 0.063
Equity premium shock 0.002 0.025 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001
Government spending shock 0.034 0.012 0.085 0.149 0.008 0.007 0.010
Monetary policy shock 0.106 0.089 0.087 0.137 0.046 0.007 0.500
t = 100 Productivity shock 0.256 0.203 0.264 0.184 0.204 0.262 0.159
Labor supply shock 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.020 0.007 0.005 0.006
Wage markup shock 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.002
Price markup shock 0.022 0.006 0.021 0.111 0.479 0.026 0.176
Preference shock 0.075 0.022 0.058 0.309 0.039 0.017 0.042
Investment shock 0.593 0.733 0.598 0.108 0.219 0.664 0.198
Equity premium shock 0.007 0.014 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.002
Government spending shock 0.018 0.012 0.025 0.135 0.009 0.011 0.010
Monetary policy shock 0.022 0.004 0.020 0.122 0.037 0.003 0.403
Figure 1. Data
Note: Series output: Real GDP per labour force, seasonally adjusted (unit is 1 million yen at
1990). Series consumption: Real consumption per labour force, s.a., (unit same as above). Series
investment: Real investment per labour force, s.a., (unit same as above). Series Labor: Labour
input index = (Work hour index*Total Employment) / Labour Population. Series wage: Real wage
index = Nominal wage index / GDP deflator. Series inflation: GDP deflator inflation rate (quar-
terly, annual rate, decadal demeaned). Series Nominal Interest Rate: Uncollateralized call rate
(annual rate, decadal demeaned). Output, consumption, investment, labor and wage are trans-
formed to their logarithms and then detrended using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. Nominal
rate and inflation are detrended using HP filter without log-transformation. After those procedure,
all above data are obtained by being demeaned.
Figure 2A. Estimated Parameter Distribution
(Before the Period of 0% Interest Rate Bound: 1970:Q1 – 1998:Q4 )
Note: The straight line plots prior distribution. The dush line plots posterior distribution. THETA
is habit persistent parameter. SIGMA C is the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
SIGMA L is the inverse elasiticy of labor supply. 1/VARPHI is the inverse adjustment cost of
investment. PHI is the fixed cost share. PSI is capital utilization cost. GAM P is price indexation.
GAM W is wage indexation. XI P is Calvo price.
Figure 2B Estimated Parameter Distribution
(Before the Period of 0% Interest Rate Bound: 1970:Q1 – 1998:Q4 )
Note: The straight line plots prior distribution. The dush line plots posterior distribution. XI W is
Calvo wage. RHO M is lagged interest rate. MU PI is the monetary policy response on inflation.
MU Y is the monetary response on output. RHO Z is persistent of productivity shock. RHO C
is persistent of preference shock. RHO G is persistent of government spending shock. RHO L is
persistent of labor supply shock. RHO I is persistent of investment shock.
Figure 2C Estimated Parameter Distribution
(Before the Period of 0% Interest Rate Bound: 1970:Q1 – 1998:Q4 )
Note: The straight line plots prior distribution. The dush line plots posterior distribution. E C is
the standard error of preference shock. E INV is the standard error of investment shock.. E Q is
the standard error of Equity Premium shock. E A is the standard error of productivity shock. E
P is the standard error of price-markup shock. E L is the standard error of labor supply shock. E
W is the standard error of wage-markup shock. E G is the standard error of government spending
shock. E M is the standard error of monetary policy shock.
Figure 3A. Productivity Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3B. Labor Supply Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3C. Wage Markup Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3D. Price Markup Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3E. Preference Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3F. Investment Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3G. Equity Premium Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3H. Government Spending Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
Figure 3I. Monetary Policy Shock
Note: The straight line plot the median response. The dush lines plot the 5th and the 95 percentiles
of the response.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4A.  Variance Decomposition of Output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 4 10 30
 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95%
Preference 0.39 0.58 0.20 0.41 0.10 0.31 0.04 0.18
Investment 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.17 0.65
Equity premium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Wage markup 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Productivity 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.44 0.14 0.67 0.02 0.58
Price markup 0.04 0.12 0.08 0.18 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.07
Government spending 0.13 0.27 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.07
Monetary policy 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.01 0.07
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Figure 4B.  Variance Decomposition of Inflation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 4 10 30
 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95%
Preference 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Investment 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.18
Equity premium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
Wage markup 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Productivity 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.33 0.07 0.34 0.07 0.34
Price markup 0.66 0.87 0.52 0.77 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.72
Government spending 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Monetary policy 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07
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Figure 4C.  Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate. 
 
 
 
 1 4 10 30
 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95% 5% 95%
Preference 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Investment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.17
Equity premium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labor supply 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Wage markup 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Productivity 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.24 0.04 0.26
Price markup 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.31 0.15 0.29 0.14 0.28
Government spending 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Monetary policy 0.77 0.89 0.48 0.67 0.40 0.60 0.35 0.57
